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Past research nds that males outperform females in competitive situations. Using
data from multiple-round math tournaments, we verify this nding during the initial
round of competition. The performance gap between males and females, however, dis-
appears after the rst round. In later rounds, only math ability (not gender) serves
as a signicant predictor of performance. Several possible explanations are discussed.
The results suggest that we should be cautious about using data from one-round ex-
periments to generalize about behavior. (JEL J16, C93)
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11 Introduction
In their important paper, Gneezy et al. (2003) show that males and females respond dier-
ently to competition. The authors conduct experiments in which college students are paid to
solve mazes, either on their own or in competition with others. They show that competition
causes males to increase their performance relative to females. Gneezy and Rustichini (2004)
study footraces between fourth graders and nd a similar result: boys respond favorably to
competition, while girls do not.1 These results imply that males perform better in competi-
tive settings than otherwise similar females,2 and the results may help explain achievement
dierences between males and females in professional and academic settings.3
These past papers consider one-round competitions. It is reasonable, however, that the
gender dierences do not persist over multiple rounds of competition. Males, for example,
may have more competitive (e.g., sports) experience and nd the idea of competing less
intimidating or more exciting than females. If this is the case, females may improve their
performance over time as they become more comfortable with the competitive environment,
or male performance may fall as their enthusiasm dissipates. We attempt to better un-
derstand gender dierences in competition by considering how robust the earlier gender-gap
results are to multiple rounds of participation. As competitors gain experience, do the gender
dierences persist or do they disappear?
We hold a series of multiple-round math competitions in which participants race against
a randomly assigned opponent to complete math problems. Controlling for math ability
(based on prior test scores), males perform over 0.4 standard deviations better than females
1Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2000) nd evidence that one's performance on dicult verbal and math tests
may depend on the gender composition of the group of people sitting in close proximity, even when they
are not directly competing. Antonovics et al. (2009) showed that males were more likely to answer trivia
questions correctly when a larger fraction of their competitors were female. In the present analysis, we
focus on whether males perform better than females, on average, in competitive environments. We are less
concerned with whether one's performance depends on competitor gender. Although we acknowledge that
players may put in more or less eort when competing against males or females, we nd that any intra-gender
performance gap is much less signicant than the inter-gender performance gap.
2Gneezy et al. (2003) show that males solved more mazes when they were paid based on relative per-
formance than when they were paid piece-rate. The eect of competition on females was less pronounced,
although there was a more modest positive eect when females competed against other females. In both
Gneezy et al. (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), there were no statistically signicant dierences be-
tween the performances of females who competed against males and females who competed against females,
or between the performances of males who competed against males and males who competed against females.
Based on the signicance of the results, we can conclude from these papers that males respond better to
competition than similar females (although we cannot say how the results were aected by opponent gender).
3For example, only 2.5% of the highest-paid U.S. executives are women (Bertrand and Hallock (2001);
for an overview of the gender pay gap, see Blau and Kahn (2000)). Kleinjans (2009) presents evidence
that dierences in male-female taste for competition may help explain a portion of the sorting into dierent
professions. Price (2008) shows that an increase in competition for funding in graduate school causes males
to increase their performance relative to females.
2during the rst round of competition. This result is consistent with the ndings from the
one-round experiments in the literature.
During the rst round of competition, one's gender and ability, as well as opponent
ability, are all signicant predictors of performance. In round two and onward, only math
ability serves as a signicant predictor of performance; gender and opponent ability no longer
matter. After the rst round, the performance gap disappears and females perform just as
well as males.
The short-lived nature of the gender performance gap is consistent with some types
of gender dierences, but not others. Because the gender gap disappears, the data do not
support an explanation in which males and females dier in signicant, permanent ways (e.g.,
males are always better at dealing with the stresses of competition, care more about winning,
or get more enjoyment from competing).4 The fact that the gender dierences vanish after
only one round (rather than gradually) does not lend support to models in which participants
learn about their relative ability or build self-condence over time.5 Furthermore, we nd
evidence that the initial gender gap is caused by male overperformance rather than female
underperformance. This means the data do not support an explanation in which females
are hesitant to compete. Rather, the evidence is consistent with a model in which males are
initially more enthusiastic about competing than females, but this overexcitement quickly
disappears with exposure to competition.6
In later rounds of competition, both males and females steadily improve their perfor-
4Even if males are no better than females at performing outside of competition, males might still have an
ability advantage over females if they can better deal with the stresses of competition. Only by considering
multiple rounds of competition are we able rule out this possibility.
5Gneezy et al. (2003) suggest that females underestimate female ability relative to male ability. However,
this conclusion is based on the observation that females respond more to competition when they are com-
peting against other females than when they are competing against males. Not only is this observation not
signicant (p-value = 0.1025), it is not replicated in Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), and does not provide
sucient evidence to rule out other explanations of the performance gap. For example, their data are also
consistent with a model in which females tend to be more nervous when competing against males than when
competing against other females.
6This is consistent with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) who show that, given a choice, males are more
likely to compete than females. Similarly, Sapienza et al. (2009) claim that at Northwestern University, 36%
of female versus 57% of male MBA students choose competitive nance careers. Additionally, Booth and
Nolen (2009) and Gneezy et al. (forthcoming) show that preferences towards competition may be due to
past experience. Specically, Booth and Nolen (2009) show that females who attend all girls schools are
more likely to choose competition (even when competition was against males) than were females in coed
schools. Gneezy et al. (forthcoming) show that in a matrilineal society, women prefer competition more
than males. Dreber et al. (2009) nd no gender dierences in female activities including skipping rope and
dancing. G unther et al. (2008) nd no ascertainable dierence between male and female performance when
participants compete solving word games, a task they claim is gender neutral. They argue that the gender
dierences go away because there are no gender stereotypes associated with completing the task. Our results
suggest an alternative explanation in which the gender dierences would go away because males are less
likely (or females are more likely) to be overeager to compete in gender-neutral or female activities.
3mance. This is consistent with a model in which participants learn to compete or become
more comfortable with competition over time. This gradual improvement in the later rounds
is present for both males and females, and cannot explain the rst round gender dierences.
We nd no evidence that either males or females perform better in the long run.
The results advance our understanding of gender dierences in competition. The ndings
also have implications for experimental research more generally. We show that performance
during the rst round of our experiment is very dierent from performance after the rst
round. This suggests that there may be value to repeating experiments more than once, and
that we need to be careful about using results from one round to generalize about behavior.
Section 2 describes our eld experiment in detail. In Section 3, we conduct the analysis
and discuss possible explanations for the gender dierences. Section 4 concludes with a
discussion of the results, policy implications, and directions for future research.
2 Math Competitions
Working with school ocials and teachers, we held a series of in-classroom math competitions
with a total of 185 fourth grade students. In each of eight classrooms, students participated
in up to ve rounds of competition.7 In each round, each student was randomly paired with
another student, and then raced against this opponent to complete a series of math questions
drawn from past fourth grade state assessments. The competitions occurred in the spring, a
few weeks before students took the state assessment. This assured the questions were grade
appropriate and, because the students had been together all year, meant that students were
familiar with one another and were likely to have some idea of the math ability of the other
students.
In each round, students were given a sheet with 10 multiple choice questions. They had
ve minutes to solve as many questions as possible. If a student nished before the ve
minutes were up, he or she could \buzz in" early. The student with the most correct answers
in each pair won the round. If both students had the same number of correct answers, the
student who buzzed in rst won the round. Winning a round entitled the student to two
rae tickets. In the case of a tie when neither student buzzed in early, both students received
one ticket. At the end of the tournament, we randomly drew three rae tickets for each
classroom and the winners received candy bars.8
7Four classes participated in ve rounds of competitions. Due to time constraints, two classes had only
three rounds and two classes had only four rounds.
8Our tournaments took place a few weeks before the state assessment tests and were used as a way of
preparing the students for those tests. If a student buzzed in early, he or she was required to stop working;
the opponent could continue working until the end of the ve minutes. There were no penalties for incorrect
4The school district provided prior-year (third grade) standardized math test results for
all students except those who recently moved into the district or for some other reason did
not take the math assessment the year before. In total, we have test performance data for
ninety percent of the competitors. The state uses its own criterion-referenced test for its
end-of-year assessment. The un-normalized student state assessment scores in our sample
have a mean of 172 (standard deviation of 12) with no signicant dierences in the scores
between boys and girls.
Although parents could opt out from their child participating, the competitions were
presented as school activities, and no one opted out. We are, therefore, unconcerned about
selection bias.
3 Identifying Gender Dierences
3.1 Empirical Strategy
Let yi;r be student i's score in round r, where all scores are normalized by round and class
to be mean 0 and standard deviation 1.9 Let  yi; r be i's average score over the other four
rounds of competition, a noisy measure of ability. The average score of i's round r opponent
(in the opponent's other rounds) is  y i; r. We run regressions of the following form:
yi;r =  + 1 yi; r + 2 y i; r + g(i; i) + i;r.
The function g(i; i) is used to capture gender eects based on the student's gender and
that of his or her opponent. As written, the OLS regression may be inconsistent due to
measurement error in both ability scores. We address this by instrumenting student ability
and opponent ability measures with the student and opponent's normalized scores on the
prior year state assessment test.10
Table 1 reports the results from the IV analysis. For those interested, Table 2 provides
results on the male-female gap from several alternate specications. There we consider
OLS specications using state assessment scores for our two ability measures. We also
run regressions excluding some or all of the ability controls entirely or allowing the ability
answers. After each round of competition, the students graded each other's test and each pair agreed upon
the outcome of the round. We observed no collusion or cheating among the students.
9We normalize scores for the regressions to make results easily comparable to the education research
on tests scores and to remove from the analysis classroom idiosyncrasies in ability or testing environment.
As we show in Table 2, regressions using raw scores or when normalized just by round produce the same
substantive results.
10The instrumental variables specication is not needed to correct any simultaneity bias, it is simply a
correction for the measurement error inherent in measuring math ability with nite resources.
5coecients to dier by gender. Lastly, we consider dierent normalizations of the competition
data. In all of these alternative specications the estimated male-female gap is negative and
signicant in the rst round, and small and never signicantly negative in the later rounds.
In addition to these regressions, we consider data regarding round-by-round scores by
both gender and ability. This data allows us to distinguish between male over-performance
and female under-performance in the initial round of competition. We also use this data and
the regression results to better understand changes in the performance of both males and
females over the later rounds of competition.
3.2 First Round
We rst identify signicant gender dierences in performance during the rst round of com-
petition. This gender gap is consistent with the literature using one-round competitions.
In Table 1 results, regression 1 controls for a participant's own gender. Regression 2
controls for both participant and opponent gender, considering four distinct cases: male
subject against male opponent (MvM), male subject against female opponent (MvF), female
subject against male opponent (FvM), and female subject against female opponent (FvF).
There is a signicant and very large negative eect of being female on performance. In
regression 1, the gap between female and male competitors is provided by the coecient
on the Female dummy variable, which shows females doing 0.44 standard deviations worse
than males of similar ability. The rst round performance gap between males and females
is highly signicant (p-value = 0.007).
We use regression 2 to test whether opponent gender aects performance. Opponent
gender does not appear to have a signicant impact on performance. That is, there is no
signicant dierence between the FvM and FvF coecients, or between the MvF coecient
and the MvM baseline. Therefore, although females perform signicantly worse than males,
their performance does not appear to be inuenced by the gender of their opponent.
In both regressions 1 and 2, the coecient on opponent ability is signicant. That is,
one's performance is decreasing in opponent ability. We discuss this result further in Section
3.4.
3.3 Multiple Rounds
After the rst round of competition, the gender dierence disappears. In the second round
of competition, and in all subsequent rounds, only math ability signicantly aects perfor-
mance.
6Regressions 3 and 4 are identical to the rst two regressions, except they now consider
the second round of competition. Regressions 5 and 6 pool the data from rounds two through
ve.11 In regressions 3 and 5 we see that the female eect (which now has a positive coe-
cient) is insignicant (p-values = 0.92 and 0.21). We can also formally reject that the female
eect is the same between rounds 1 and 2 (p-value = 0.04). Regressions 4 and 6 control
for opponent gender and continue to nd no gender eects. We can statistically reject the
hypothesis that the female eect is the same in regressions 1 and 5 (p-value = 0.02). We
nd no evidence that females continue to perform worse than males after the rst round of
competition.
A few other patterns in the multiple round data are worth mentioning. From Table 1,
we see that the coecient on ability goes from 0.46 in round one, to 0.68 in round two, to
1.30 in the pooled data for rounds two through ve. The dierence between the round 1 and
2 ability coecients is not signicant, but the dierence between round 1 and the pooled
rounds 2 through 5 is signicant (p-value = 0.03). Furthermore, the coecient on opponent
ability is negative and signicant in the rst round; after the rst round it is insignicant,
and it becomes smaller over time; although the results are not precise enough to reject the
hypothesis that the coecient is the same across all specications.
Figure 1 shows the average number of correct answers (out of a possible 10) by round
by gender. The data show that females on average perform just as well in the second round
as they do in the rst round. Males, however, perform signicantly better in the rst round
than in the second. Formally, we cannot reject a hypothesis that female scores in the rst
two rounds come from the same distribution (p-value = 0.41), and we can reject a hypothesis
that male scores in round one come from the same distribution as round two scores (p-value
= 0.004). After the second round, the performance of both males and females steadily
improves over the remaining rounds.
Additionally, we consider whether the eect of experience depends on relative ability.
To do so, we divide our subjects into three equal-sized categories based on prior-year stan-
dardized test scores: low-ability, middle-ability, and high-ability. Figure 2 shows the average
number of correct answers by ability level for each round of competition. Low-ability partici-
pants, for example, correctly answer an average of 3.6 (out of a possible 10) questions during
the rst round of competition and improve to 3.8 correct answers by the nal round, an
eight percent improvement. High-ability participants do slightly better in the rst round of
competition answering an average 4.3 questions correctly. By the nal round of competition,
high-ability participants answer an average of 7.3 questions correctly, a 67 percent improve-
11In unreported results we ran individual regressions by round. For rounds 2 through 5 the gender gap
was never signicantly dierent from zero.
7ment. We test if the changes between rounds are the same across ability groups, and reject
this hypothesis (p-value = 0.004). (Similar results are found if we look at round 2 perfor-
mance rather than round 1 performance; thus, the initial gender dierences are not driving
these ndings.) These results will help when we work to distinguish between alternate types
of gender dierences in Section 3.4.12
In summary, the analysis nds the following results:
1. Males outperform females in the rst round of competition, but not thereafter.
2. Males perform better in the rst round than in the second round; females perform
equally well in the rst and second round.
3. Both males and females steadily improve over rounds two through ve.
4. High ability participants improve more than low ability participants in rounds two
through ve.
5. The coecient on ability increases and becomes more signicant, and the coecient
on opponent ability decreases and becomes less signicant over multiple rounds.
3.4 Explaining Gender Dierences
The primary goal of this analysis is to better understand gender dierences in competition.
Prior analyses show that during a single-round of competition, males outperform females.
Possible explanations for this performance gap included (i) males being inherently better
competitors than females, (ii) males being overcondent or females being undercondent
in their respective ability, (iii) females being more nervous or intimidated by competition
than males, and (iv) males being more eager to compete than females. In the appendix, we
provide a game theoretic model of competition and show that each of these types of gender
dierences can result in males outperforming females in a single round of competition, but
the four possibilities have dierent implications about performance in the long run. All of
these possibilities cannot explain the short-lived nature of the gender dierences in our data.
The disappearance of gender dierences suggests that the male-female performance gap
is not caused by inherent dierences in ability or preferences. After the rst round of
competition, we nd no evidence that males are better competitors than females. Thus,
we nd no support for the possibility that males are inherently better competitors than
females.
12As discussed earlier, some schools only competed in 3 or 4 rounds. Excluding these classes yields similar
gures and the same patterns emerge.
8If the gender performance gap resulted from dierences in self condence, then we expect
the performance gap to gradually disappear as participants gain experience. However, we
observe that the gender gap does not gradually disappear, but rather vanishes after only one
round of competition. The sudden disappearance of the gender dierences is not consistent
with a model of learning. It's unreasonable to believe that females, for example, remained
undercondent in their abilities through all of their past experiences, only to completely over-
come this undercondence during one round of math competition. Thus, we nd no support
for an explanation in which gender dierences result from dierences in self condence.
Explanations in which females are more nervous or males are more eager to compete are
both consistent with the short-lived nature of the gender dierences. It is reasonable that
female nervousness or male excitement settles down after one round. We show, however, that
female performance is unchanged between the rst and second round, suggesting that female
nervousness is not causing the performance gap in the rst period. On the other hand, male
performance decreases between the rst and second round of competition lending support
to the explanation in which males are more excited to compete during the rst round, and
that this eagerness dissipates before the second round of competition.
This nding has interesting implications. It suggests that the initial gender gap is due
to male overperformance rather than female underperformance. The high male performance
may result because males are more excited about competing than females. Males may
overestimate their enjoyment from competition; they are \quick out of the gate" at the start
of the competition, but then their enthusiasm about competing quickly settles down to the
same level as females. This model is consistent with other papers showing that males are
overeager to compete (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund 2007).
3.5 Eect of Experience in Long Run
A secondary goal of the analysis is to understand how competitive performance changes
with experience. We observe a steady increase in the performance of both males and females
after rounds two.13 Possible explanations for this include participants becoming better com-
petitors, more condent, or more comfortable (i.e., less nervous) over the course of the
competition. We argue that the data is most consistent with a model in which competitors
13Tables 1 and 2 show that the female coecient small insignicant in round 2 and in the pooled rounds
2-5. This is true for the IV specication in Table 1, as well as in 11 of the 12 round 2-5 robustness checks
in Table 2. The only exception is when we exclude opponent ability in the IV analysis, in which case the
female coecient for pooled rounds 2-5 is positive and signicant, yet relatively small. However, given that
the competitors in our experiment have spent almost an entire school year in the same classroom as their
opponents, we do not put much faith in this particular regression relative to each of our other regressions in
which the coecient was insignicant.
9become more comfortable over time, although we cannot rule out the other possibilities.
In Table 1 the coecient on ability increases and becomes more signicant in rounds two
through ve. Furthermore, the coecient on opponent ability becomes less signicant over
multiple rounds. These pieces of evidence are consistent with participants becoming more
focused. One reason for this may be if participants are becoming less nervous. Furthermore,
our nding that high-ability participants improve more than low-ability participants over the
course of the competition is also consistent with an explanation in which participants become
more comfortable with competition over time. In particular, the evidence is consistent with
the psychology literature, which shows that high-ability people are more likely to be eected
by nerves and to choke under pressure than low-ability people (e.g., Beilock and Carr 2005,
show this in math competitions).
4 Conclusion
Using data from multiple-round math competitions, we identify a performance gap between
males and females during the rst round of competition; a result that is consistent with
the past literature. We then show that these dierences disappear after the rst round
of competition. Through the later rounds of competition, we nd no evidence that males
outperform females of similar ability.
The analysis considers various explanations for the initial{but transitory{gender dier-
ences in competition. We nd no evidence that males and females dier in their ability to
compete, or that the gender gap is caused by female undercondence of male overcondence.
Rather, the evidence is consistent with an explanation in which males initially tend to be
overeager to compete.
The results suggest that programs designed to encourage female participation in compe-
tition may increase the number of females entering competitive elds of employment. While
not specically about entry into competitive elds, Stevenson (forthcoming) nds that the
increase in sports participation that accompanied the passage of Title IX led to a 15 percent
increase in the fraction of women entering traditionally male occupations.14 According to
our results, however, the initial gender gap and the sorting into dierent elds may be due to
males overestimating their enjoyment from competition (not from dierences in competitive
ability, self condence, or comfort in competitive settings). This means that Title IX may
encourage more females to enter competitive elds by increasing female enthusiasm towards
competition.
14Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 requires that U.S. schools provide equal funding and
attention for both female and male sports teams.
10At a minimum, our results suggest that we are far from a complete understanding of
gender dierences in competition. Future work is needed to determine to what extent the
one-round gender dierences may aect sorting of males and females into dierent profes-
sions, or long run achievement in competitive settings. If, for example, males are always
overly eager to compete, then the gender dierences may result in large long-run dierences
in performance. Future work is also needed to determine the extent to which the (round-one)
gender dierences identied here and elsewhere may be eliminated through repeated expo-
sure to competitive experience. For example, can encouraging sports participation amongst
females help eliminate the initial gender dierences? It would also be interesting to consider
whether our ndings carry over to other activities. The gender dierences may go away after
one round because the math competition was less enjoyable than males expected; maybe
other activities turn out to be more enjoyable than expected.
Our results also have implications for experimental research more generally, as they
suggest that there may be value to repeating experiments more than once. Our ndings in
rounds two and onward in our experiment are vastly dierent from our rst round results.
This suggests there is risk in using rst round results to generalize about behavior, something
that is often done in the experimental literature.
5 Appendix
5.1 Game Theoretic Model of Competition
Consider the following model of competition. Two players, i 2 f1;2g, compete for a prize. The
function A describes a player's overall ability, where i's ability depends on both his or her math
ability mi and competitive ability ai (e.g., ability to focus under pressure). For player i, A(mi;ai) >
0, @A=@mi > 0, and @A=@ai > 0 for all possible mi and ai.
Both players simultaneously choose their level of eort ei > 0, with the likelihood of winning
the prize dependent on both players' eort and ability. Let i(e;m;a) denote the probability i wins





We refer to pi  A(mi;ai)ei as i's performance, and the subscript  i refers to i's opponent.15
Players care about winning the prize and nd eort costly. If player i wins the prize, he or she
15The formulation of the model incorporates uncertainty about performance in the competition through
i(e;m;a) being between 0 and 1. Even if a player knows that she is higher ability than her opponent, there
is still a positive probability that her opponent wins in equilibrium.
11earns Ui = v   ciei, where v > 0 is the value of winning and ci > 0 is the cost of eort. If i does
not win the prize, Ui =  ciei.
We solve for the symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under complete information.







 i(v;a;c) denotes the opponent's equilibrium eort choice given m, a, c = fc1;c2g, and v.




(A(mi;ai)ci + A(m i;a i)c i)2, (1)




(A(mi;ai)ci + A(m i;a i)c i)2. (2)
Notice that p
i is strictly increasing in both mi and ai, and strictly decreasing in ci. Furthermore,
p
i > p
 i if and only if A(mi;ai) > A(m i;a i); if both i and  i have the same math ability, then
p
i > p
 i if and only if ai > a i.
We can use this framework to consider the possible types of gender dierences from Section 3.4.
We discuss cases (i), (iii), and (iv), which each involve actual dierences in the model's parameters,
before discussing case (ii), which involves perceived dierences in parameters. First, suppose that
males are inherently better competitors than females. The is possibility (i) from the text. In this
case, males tend to have higher ai than females. Then, assuming both males and females have
similar m and c, males will tend to perform better than females. In this case, the dierences in a
are inherent and should persist over multiple rounds of competition. Females may learn to compete,
but we expect this learning to require multiple rounds of experience.16
Alternatively, females may tend to be more nervous than males. This is possibility (iii) from the
text. In this case, nerves may result in females starting the competition with a lower ai than males.
However, once females become used to the competition, they will no longer be at a disadvantage.
That is, if females are more nervous than males, we expect that females will initially perform worse
than males, but that this performance dierence may disappear after exposure to at least one round
of competition. This possibility, however, predicts that the gender dierences are eliminated due
to an increase in female performance.
If males tend to be more excited about competing, they initially have a lower ci than females.
This is possibility (iv) from the text. The predictions are similar to the case of nerves, as the
excitement may dissipate after the rst round. However, this model predicts that the gender
16If males and females have the same ability, but instead dier in terms of their value of winning or cost
of eort, the model will continue to produce similar results.
12dierences are eliminated due to a decrease in male performance, rather than a change in female
performance.
A nal possibility is that females and males dier in their self condence. This is possi-
bility (ii) from the text. Suppose that player i underestimates her own A(mi;ai), which may
be because she underestimates either mi or ai. Player  i has correct beliefs about his ability.
To keep the example as straightforward as possible, we assume that neither player knows that
player i may underestimate her ability. Let ~ A < A(mi;ai) denote i's beliefs about her ability.
In this case, i puts in eort e
i = ~ AA(m i;a i)v=(( ~ A + A(m i;a i))2c) achieving performance
p
i = ~ AA(mi;ai)A(m i;a i)v=(( ~ A + A(m i;a i))2c). Player  i puts in eort and achieves per-
formance according to equations 1 and 2. The player who underestimates her own ability puts in
lower eort and achieves lower performance than she otherwise would. If males and females have
the same actual ability, but females underestimate their ability, then females will tend to perform
worse than males. They may learn about their true ability over time, but again, we expect this
learning requires multiple rounds of experience.
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14(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ability 0.46* 0.47* 0.68*** 0.65*** 1.30*** 1.30***
[0.27] [0.27] [0.20] [0.20] [0.13] [0.13]
Opponent Ability -0.48* -0.47* -0.19 -0.19 -0.07 -0.07
[0.25] [0.24] [0.19] [0.19] [0.14] [0.13]








Constant 0.15 0.17 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01
[0.12] [0.21] [0.10] [0.12] [0.05] [0.07]
Observations 152 152 150 150 516 516
Notes: Dependent variable is the student's normalized score.  Robust standard errors in brackets are 
clustered by student in regressions (5) and (6).  Unreported non-robust standard errors are similar.  * 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.   Ability and Opponent Ability are the 
student's average score across the other rounds of the tournament.  Both are instrumented by student and 
opponent state assessment scores.  Observation numbers change between first and second rounds due to 
students switching opponents, some of whom are missing data on the state assessment test score 
instrument.  First stage F-statistics for excluded instruments are 24.5 and 25.1 in regression (1) and the 
same or larger in other rounds.







Round 1 Round 2 Rounds 2-5Round 1 Round 2 Rounds 2-5 Round 1 Round 2 Rounds 2-5
Baseline Regression -0.35** -0.09 -0.05 -0.44*** 0.02 0.08
[0.15] [0.16] [0.11] [0.17] [0.15] [0.06]
Exclude Opponent Ability -0.36** -0.02 -0.01 -0.36** 0.06 0.11*
[0.15] [0.15] [0.10] [0.14] [0.13] [0.06]
-0.30** 0.09 0.08 - - -
[0.14] [0.15] [0.11]
-0.36** -0.09 -0.05 -0.44** 0.01 0.09
[0.16] [0.16] [0.10] [0.17] [0.15] [0.07]
-0.28* -0.07 0.02 -0.35** -0.03 0.08
[0.16] [0.16] [0.12] [0.16] [0.14] [0.06]
-0.64* -0.18 0.02 -0.81** 0.05 0.34
[0.37] [0.42] [0.32] [0.38] [0.39] [0.27]
Normalize Scores by 
Round Only
Notes: Reported values are the coefficient and standard error on the "Female" dummy variable in 
regressions of the form reported in Table 1.  Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by 
student for Rounds 2-5.  * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.   OLS 
regressions control for ability and opponent ability using prior year state assessment math test. IV 
regressions instrument student performance in other rounds with prior year state assessment math test.  
Since ability covariates are mean zero for both girls and boys, the dummy variable in Row 4 still 
reports the mean Male-Female gap.  For the same regression, one cannot reject the hypothesis that 
there are no differences in the ability coefficients across gender, though results are imprecise.
OLS IV
Allow Ability Coefficients 
to Differ by Gender
Use Raw Scores for Dep. 
Var.
Exclude Both Ability 
Controls
Table 2: Robustness of Table 1 Results -- Female CoefficientFigure 2: Raw Scores by Round and Prior Ability
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